By Francesco Calderoni, Gian Maria Campedelli, Aron Szekely, Mario Paolucci, Giulia Andrighetto

« Objectives
We test the effects of four policy scenarios on recruitment into organized crime. The policy scenarios target (i) organized crime leaders and (ii) facilitators for imprisonment, (iii) provide educational and welfare support to children and their mothers while separating them from organized-crime fathers, and (iv) increase educational and social support to at-risk schoolchildren.
Methods
We developed a novel agent-based model drawing on theories of peer effects (differential association, social learning), social embeddedness of organized crime, and the general theory of crime. Agents are simultaneously embedded in multiple social networks (household, kinship, school, work, friends, and co-offending) and possess heterogeneous individual attributes. Relational and individual attributes determine the probability of offending. Co-offending with organized crime members determines recruitment into the criminal group. All the main parameters are calibrated on data from Palermo or Sicily (Italy). We test the effect of the four policy scenarios against a baseline no-intervention scenario on the number of newly recruited and total organized crime members using Generalized Estimating Equations models.
Results
The simulations generate realistic outcomes, with relatively stable organized crime membership and crime rates. All simulated policy interventions reduce the total number of members, whereas all but primary socialization reduce newly recruited members. The intensity of the effects, however, varies across dependent variables and models.
Conclusions
Agent-based models effectively enable to develop theoretically driven and empirically calibrated simulations of organized crime. The simulations can fill the gaps in evaluation research in the field of organized crime and allow us to test different policies in different environmental contexts. »

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